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Abstract  
The relationship between nonverbal communication and deception continues to attract 
much interest, but there are many misconceptions about this relationship. In this 
review we present a scientific view on the relationship. We describe theories 
explaining why liars would behave differently from truth tellers, followed by research 
how liars actually behave and people’s ability to catch them. We will show that the 
nonverbal cues to deceit known to date are faint and unreliable, and that people are 
mediocre lie catchers when they pay attention to behavior. We will also discuss why 
people hold misbeliefs about the relationship between nonverbal behavior and 
deception - beliefs that appear very hard to debunk. We further discuss that 
researchers could improve the state of affairs by examining nonverbal behaviors in 
different ways and in different settings than they currently do.   
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Reading others 
Life is so full of encounters with other human beings that we tend to take these 
encounters for granted. Often, social interactions run fairly seamlessly, and we do not 
spend much time reflecting on their omnipresence, or plumbing the depths of how 
they actually work. Scholars, however, have taken on the task of trying to understand 
social interaction in all its complexity. There is now a vast body of scientific literature 
on this topic spanning multiple disciplines, including psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, linguistics and philosophy.  
When we interact with others, we make judgments of the other person’s state 
of mind – we try to read their emotions, thoughts, needs and intentions. This makes 
sense, because knowing what is going on in another person’s head can be used both to 
coordinate cooperative interactions, and to gain advantage in competitive ones.  
A non-disputed claim in psychology is that mind reading (i.e., making 
inferences about another’s state of mind) is central to social interactions. The 
psychological picture of humans painted by modern social and cognitive psychology 
is that of chronic mind readers, who constantly engage in rapid and partly automatic 
evaluation of the mental states of other people. How good are we then at accurately 
reading minds? The major finding from research is that we are not as good at reading 
other people as we think. We are not operating in complete darkness, but we vastly 
and consistently overestimate our skills (Epley, 2015). This is an arresting finding that 
cuts to the heart of our beliefs about ourselves as social agents.  
Reading deception and truth 
If mind reading is inaccurate in everyday life it might lead to confusion, 
misunderstandings and unnecessary conflict between individuals. Faulty mind reading 
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can also have catastrophic consequences for individuals or for society as a whole. 
Deception is such an example where misjudgments can be costly. Nobody knows how 
many innocent people have suffered unjust punishment because others have judged 
them to be guilty, but we do know that this problem is substantial (Garrett, 2011; 
Scheck, Neufeld & Dwyer, 2003). Thousands of people have died in terrorist attacks 
that could have been prevented if the deceptions involved to execute the attacks had 
been detected. So, in contrast to casual social judgments, judgments of deception and 
truth can literally be a matter of life and death. 
There is an extensive body of work on deception and its detection. In this 
article we offer an overview and a critical discussion of this literature and focus 
hereby on the role of nonverbal behavior in telling and reading lies. We do so 
because, unlike verbal or physiological lie detection, judgements of nonverbal 
behavior can be made in every social encounter. Nonverbal lie detection is also a 
domain where many myths continue to exist: People typically overestimate the 
relationship between deception and nonverbal behavior and the ability to detect deceit 
by observing nonverbal behavior. 
Two Annual Review of Psychology articles about deception proceeds this 
article. Hyman’s (1989) theoretical contribution made us aware how much more 
deception research is published nowadays. Hyman covered the period 1966 – 1986. 
Using SCOPUS search software with key words “lie detection” or “deception” we 
found 415 psychology articles for this period, an average of 20.75 per year. In the 
year 2016 alone we found 206 psychology articles, almost ten times as many. More 
recently, Pennebaker, Mehl, and Niederhoffer (2003) published an article that 
included deception, but it focused on word use rather than nonverbal behavior. In 
other words, this is the first Annual Review of Psychology article about nonverbal 
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behavior and deception. We will provide a comprehensive overview and rely hereby 
on seminal publications in this field.  
Detecting deception through nonverbal behavior 
  The notion that lies are transparent and can be detected through nonverbal 
behavior dates back a long time. As early as 900 B.C., it was claimed that liars shiver 
and engage in fidgeting behaviors (Trovillo, 1939a). In 1908, Münsterberg pointed to 
the utility of observing posture, eye movements, and knee jerks for lie detection 
purposes (Trovillo, 1939b). Famously, Freud (1959) wrote: “He who has eyes to see 
and ears to hear may convince himself that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are 
silent, he chatters with his finger-tips; betrayal oozes out of him at every pore” (p. 94). 
  Popular culture reflects the enduring belief that liars give themselves away 
through nonverbal behavior. For example, there are numerous books aimed at a 
popular audience recommending ways to decipher deception based on demeanor (e.g., 
Houston, Floyd and Carnicero, 2012; Meyer, 2010) Also, the basic mythology of the 
‘leaky liar’ is integrated into American police interrogation manuals (Vrij & Granhag, 
2007). The belief in the detectability of lies is also built into many legal presumptions 
– for example, jurors in criminal cases are often asked to pay attention to the 
defendant’s nonverbal behavior in order to assess their truthfulness (Sporer & 
Schwandt, 2006; Vrij & Turgeon, 2018).  
  The relationship between nonverbal behavior and deception intrigues people and 
represents big business. In this article, we will review what is currently known about this 
topic. We discuss theories about why liars and truth tellers would display different 
behaviors, and then review research on actual nonverbal cues to deception. As we will 
see, research consistently shows that attempting to read truth and deception results in 
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very poor accuracy rates, most likely because the behavioral traces of deception are 
faint.  
Why would truth tellers and liars display different behaviors? 
Theories of nonverbal cues to deception  
  There are many theories explaining the relationship between nonverbal 
behavior and deception. We will not offer an overview of past distinctions between 
these theoretical views, for such see Bond, Levine and Hartwig (2015). Instead, we 
will restructure the theoretical discussion and offer a reclassification of deception 
theories. Our rationale for this restructure is that the field of deception has grown 
significantly since many of the classic conceptualizations were launched (Zuckerman, 
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981), and that both social and cognitive psychology, on 
which deception theory is ultimately based, have undergone major theoretical 
developments (Fiske & Taylor, 2013).  
Figure 1 about here 
Mental Process Theories: Emotion and Cognition  
  A cluster of theories about nonverbal behavior and deception deals with the 
mental processes that are involved in producing a deceptive statement. These mental 
process theories share the premise that the most fruitful approach to understand the 
overt behavior of a liar is to inspect the internal processes that occur when lies are 
told. A critical distinction within such theories is that some focus on emotional 
processes and others on cognitive processes.  
  Emotional Theory  
  Ekman and Friesen (1969) presented the first modern theoretical 
conceptualization of nonverbal behavior and deception. Drawing on psychoanalytic 
models of the unconscious and early Darwinian theories of emotion, they 
 Nonverbal communication and deception  7 
hypothesized that a failure to completely suppress emotions associated with deception 
- anxiety, fear or even delight at the prospect of successful deceit - could result in 
nonverbal cues (the so-called leakage hypothesis). Such leakage cues could appear in 
various nonverbal channels, such as the face, arm/hands and legs/feet.  
  Ekman’s (1985/1992) theory about deceptive leakage has been highly 
influential in the popular media, even spawning a major network show (Lie to Me) 
supposedly partly based on Ekman’s life and work. However, Ekman’s claims have 
been highly criticized in the scientific community (Bond, Levine, & Hartwig, 2015; 
Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012). The problem with Ekman’s 
emotional theory is that it is lacking clear definitions of what emotions liars are 
supposed to feel, and when. Moreover, why would a truth teller in the same situation 
not experience the same emotions? To put it differently, the theory confounds 
emotion and deception (National Research Council, 2003). Partly in reaction to the 
problems of emotional theory, recent theories have focused on the cognitive processes 
underlying deception.  
  Cognitive Theories  
  The notion that liars and truth tellers would differ in cognitive processes dates 
back to Zuckerman, DePaulo and Rosenthal’s (1981) seminal paper. In the last 
decade, cognitive theories of deception have come to dominate the conceptual 
landscape. These theories generally reject the utility of focusing on liars’ emotions. 
Instead, they seek to understand how and when lying is more cognitively taxing than 
telling the truth and how such cognitive load might manifest itself in nonverbal 
behavior.  
 Cognitive Load Theory. Vrij and colleagues have built a substantial body of 
work around the notion that in interview settings lying may be more cognitively 
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demanding than telling the truth, which subsequently can be exploited for the purpose 
of lie detection (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Vrij, Fisher, Blank, Leal, & Mann, 2016; 
Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008). They have suggested a number of reasons for 
differences in cognitive load between liars and truth tellers to occur (Vrij et al., 
2008b). For example, it may be that formulating a lie is more difficult than drawing a 
truthful account from memory. For a lie to be believable, it has to contain sufficient 
details as to bear the characteristics of a self-experienced event. Still, offering details 
that sound plausible requires imagination and liars may lack such imagination. In 
addition, offering details may be risky if the target of the lie has information that 
contradicts the liar’s claims (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014).  
 Furthermore, truth tellers appear to take their credibility for granted in ways 
that liars do not. For example, truth tellers often express the belief that if they simply 
tell the truth like it happened, their innocence will become apparent to their 
communication partner (Kassin, 2005; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). If liars 
are more prone to believe that their credibility is in jeopardy, they ought to expend 
more effort to come across as believable. Finally, whereas activating the truth often 
happens automatically, activating a lie is more intentional and deliberate, and thus 
requires mental effort (Gilbert, 1991; Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 
2003). Although these are good reasons to believe that lying places a stronger burden 
on the cognitive resources than telling the truth, lying may not give rise to clear cues 
in itself – it seems that specific interview protocols are required for clear cues to 
emerge (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017).  
 Strategic Models. Strategic models are another branch of cognitive theories of 
deception. These models view the psychology of deception as a kind of game that 
demands a number of strategic decisions from the liar. They partly draw on 
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Hilgendorf and Irving’s (1981) classic model of the psychology of suspects’ decision 
making: People who have incriminating information to conceal are faced with 
strategic choices about what information to admit to, what information to conceal, and 
what information to deny. Other researchers have elaborated on this notion, primarily 
in relation to strategic interviewing techniques (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). The most 
important point is the model’s emphasis on liars’ psychology as driven by planning, 
strategizing and calculation. Research has shown that insight into liars’ interview 
strategies facilitates lie detection as long as investigators use specific interview 
techniques aimed to exploit these strategies (e.g. Cognitive Credibility Assessment, 
[Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017]; Strategic Use of Evidence, Granhag & Hartwig [2015]; 
and the Verifiability Approach, Nahari [2018]). 
Social Psychological Approaches: Interpersonal and Contextual Theories  
  The social psychological approaches to understanding nonverbal behavior to 
deception share the view that deceptive (and truthful) behavior occurs in a social 
context, in alignment with Lewin’s (1943) notion that behavior is a function of the 
person and the environment. Here, we will bring to focus three theories that are based 
on this idea.  
  Interpersonal Deception Theory 
  Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) states that deception is a dynamic 
interaction between senders and receivers of messages (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
This may sound trivial, but prior to IDT research paradigms rarely reflected the 
interactive nature of deception. IDT further states that deception unfolds in time: 
Senders monitor the behavior of receivers, and vice versa, and they mutually adjust 
their behavior in accordance with the feedback they receive from each other. Plausible 
as this may seem, IDT has been criticized on the grounds that it is conceptually 
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underdeveloped and that it fails to generate testable hypotheses (DePaulo, Ansfield & 
Bell, 1996).  
  Self-Presentational Theory 
  Drawing on Goffman’s (1959) classic work on social behavior in ordinary life, 
DePaulo (1992) proposed a theory of the psychology of deception. DePaulo argued 
that lying is not an extraordinary form of social behavior, qualitatively different from 
other forms of conduct. Following Goffman (1959), who pointed out that life is like a 
theatre and that people often behave as actors on a stage, DePaulo suggested that most 
social behavior is not raw but that people edit, groom and adjust how they come 
across to others to pursue a variety of social goals. Such editing may occur on both 
verbal and nonverbal levels.  
  In the self-presentational view of deception, liars and truth tellers share a 
common goal: to come across as truthful. To achieve this goal, both liars and truth 
tellers may engage in deliberate (and automatic) self-presentational efforts and may 
engage in similar forms of behaviors to create a credible impression (Feldman, 
Forrest, & Happ, 2002; Weiss & Feldman, 2006). This is a radical theory of 
deception, because it emphasizes the similarities between lying and truth telling rather 
than the characteristics unique to deception. However, DePaulo (1992) also points out 
that there is a critical difference between the two activities: Both liars and truth tellers 
make claims of honesty, but in contrast to truth tellers, liars know that their claims are 
illegitimate. This so-called deception discrepancy may give rise to cues to deception 
in that liars embrace their stories less, and experience a more pronounced sense of 
deliberateness.  
 Moral Psychology Theory 
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 As a theoretical framework for their seminal meta-analysis on accuracy in lie 
judgments, Bond and DePaulo (2006) introduced a new view of deception that 
emphasized the moral psychological elements of lying and judging lies. They 
proposed the double-standard hypothesis, which suggests that people have two sets of 
moral standards regarding the acceptability of lies: When we imagine ourselves being 
the target of deception, lying is a moral offense. However, when we ourselves tell a 
lie, we trivialize the seriousness of our behavior and readily generate justifications. 
Recall Ekman’s emotional theory that liars might experience guilt and shame. In 
Bond and DePaulo’s view, this may be nothing more than a projection in that we 
think that we ought to experience such emotions. When lying, we may be morally 
more pragmatic. We tell a lie for a reason, and we justify it to maintain our self-
concept as decent human beings (see self-concept maintenance theory, Mazar, Amir, 
& Ariely, 2008; and moral hypocrisy theory, Monin & Merritt, 2012). This theory 
offers a new and promising way to think about the psychology of deception, although 
deception scholars need to explore it in more detail.  
Nonverbal cues to deception: The evidence 
DePaulo et al. (2003) published the most comprehensive meta-analysis of cues 
to deception to date. It included 116 studies, examining 158 cues of which 102 could 
be considered nonverbal (vocal or visual). Fifty cues were examined in at least six 
studies, and since they give the most compelling results (DePaulo et al., 2003), we 
focus on these. Significant findings emerged for 14 of the 50 cues, and they are listed 
in Table 1. The cues are ranked in terms of their effect sizes. Cohen (1977) suggested 
that effect sizes of .20, .50, and .80 should be interpreted as small, medium, and large 
effects, respectively. Table 1 shows that the effect sizes for these diagnostic cues are 
typically small. The largest effect size was found for verbal and vocal immediacy, d = 
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.55 and the lowest for facial pleasantness, d = .12. Nine of the 14 cues listed in Table 
1 have a nonverbal element, and the average effect size for these nine cues is d = .25. 
Given that 35 of the 50 cues were (at least in part) nonverbal cues and that a large 
majority of them (26 out of 35 or 74%) did not show any relationship with deception, 
we conclude that the relationship between nonverbal cues and deception is faint and 
unreliable (e.g., DePaulo & Morris, 2004). 
  The results for the verbal cues are more promising than those for the nonverbal 
cues. Eight of the cues listed in Table 1 contain a verbal element and the average 
effect size for the eight cues is d = .30. Moreover, only a small majority of verbal cues 
(10 out of 18 or 55%) was unrelated to deception. In addition, an increasing body of 
research has shown that verbal cues to deceit can be elicited or enhanced when 
specific interview styles and protocols are introduced (Granhag & Hartwig, 2015; 
Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017). Such research does 
not exist in the nonverbal cues to deception area, so it remains doubtful that specific 
interview protocols can elicit or enhance nonverbal cues to deceit.  
DePaulo et al.’s (2003) work has been very influential. Nowadays, researchers 
mainly focus on verbal cues to deceit, largely ignoring nonverbal behaviors. DePaulo 
et al.’s thorough examination of nonverbal cues and their conclusion that those cues 
are mostly unrelated to deception and, at best, weakly related, has discouraged many 
researchers to examine nonverbal cues. This is at least what we have noticed, because 
lively debates about the merits of nonverbal lie detection do no longer take place at 
the scientific conferences we attend. Yet, nonverbal lie detection remains highly 
popular amongst practitioners and in the media, as discussed in the next section.  
Pseudo-scientific Lie Detection 
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The most popular lie detection tools used in legal contexts have in common 
that they claim that nonverbal behavior can offer guidance in the search for truth. In 
many ways, these practice-based techniques are similar in that they share the naïve 
psychological view that a deceitful person is one under emotional pressure, leaking 
cues to their internal distress through channels they are not aware of.  
There are numerous books, manuals, and training seminars sold under the 
pretense that they will make the consumer better at distinguishing between lies and 
truths. We will not enumerate them all. However, it is worth discussing some of the 
most pervasive techniques, and comparing their claims to empirical reality.  
The Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI).  
The Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI) is part of the Reid school of 
interrogation, which has been widely criticized because of its link to miscarriages of 
justice (Garrett, 2015). It consists of a list of 15 questions (e.g. "Did you commit the 
crime?”) to which truth tellers and liars are supposed to give different (non)verbal 
responses. The Reid interrogation manual (Inbau et al., 2013) refers to a field study as 
support for the BAI (Horvath et al., 1994). The problem of this field study, also 
acknowledge by Horvath et al. (1994), was a lack of ground truth because the 
researchers actually did not know which of the 60 suspects were telling the truth and 
which ones were lying. In the only laboratory experiment testing the BAI to date, the 
liars and truth tellers did not display the nonverbal responses predicted in the BAI 
(Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2006).  
Facial micro-expressions.  
Ekman has long argued that deceptive emotional information is leaked by 
micro-expressions, fleeting but complete facial expressions that are thought to reveal 
the felt emotion during emotional concealment (Ekman, 1985). This idea has enjoyed 
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popularity in the media (Henig, 2006) and scientific community (Schubert, 2006), 
despite a lack of research. Porter and ten Brinke (2008) conducted the first and to date 
only published experiment into the relationship between micro-expressions and 
deception. They found micro-expressions in only 14 video-fragments (2% of the 
video-fragments included in the study), and six were displayed by truth tellers rather 
than by liars.  
Neurolinguistic programming (NLP).  
Neurolinguistic programming (NLP) is offered to practitioners as a tool to 
improve communication skills, including how to detect deception. In the NLP 
literature it is suggested that truth tellers and liars differ from each other in the 
specific eye movements they display. Interestingly, the founders of NLP (Bandler & 
Grinder, 1979) never suggested this, but the claim has appeared elsewhere. For 
example, Rhoads and Solomon (1989) claimed a link between eye movements and 
deception, referring to four independent studies without referencing them. Scientific 
studies found no support for the NLP related eye movement hypothesis (Mann et al., 
2012b; Wiseman et al., 2012). 
The baseline approach.  
Sometimes investigators are trained to examine a suspect’s natural, truthful, 
nonverbal behavior at the beginning of an interview through small talk (Frank, 
Yarbrough, & Ekman, 2006; Inbau et al., 2013). This behavior is then used as a 
baseline comparison with the investigative part of the interview, whereby any 
difference in response between the baseline and investigative part of the interview 
could be interpreted as a sign of deceit (Vrij, 2016). The problem with the approach is 
obvious: There are fundamental differences between small talk and the investigative 
part of the interview, which could influence someone’s behavior, and this ‘apple–
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orange’ comparison will be prone to incorrect judgments (Moston & Engelberg, 
1993). Although baseline deception research exists (Brandt, Miller, & Hocking, 
1980a, b; Feeley, deTurck, & Young, 1995), research comparing specific behaviors of 
truth tellers and liars during the baseline and investigative parts of the interview does 
not exist.  
  In conclusion, practitioners are offered a variety of lie detection techniques 
which amount to little more than pseudoscience. It is a lamentable state of affairs that 
professionals are taught all sorts of techniques with no evidence that they actually 
work. As discussed earlier, misjudging deception can have severe and costly 
consequences. Unfortunately it is not illegal to bring bogus training packages onto the 
market. Professionals should ask for conclusive evidence that the proposed techniques 
actually work, before signing up to any course in ‘lie-detection’.  
How the cues relate to the theoretical perspectives? 
  The extent to which the empirical landscape supports the theories we have 
outlined is difficult to determine, because some theories predict similar patterns, and 
some cues can be taken as support for several theories. This is perhaps a reflection of 
a problematic state of affairs theory-wise in that we have yet to arrive at a sufficiently 
coherent synthesis of principles to allow for unambiguous predictions and 
conclusions.  
  In some ways, it is easier to point to theories that have not received empirical 
support. From the pattern derived from meta-analyses, it is clear that the emotional 
theory is not supported much, with only two cues (nervousness and tense) being 
weakly related to deception. This is an important finding for the study of nonverbal 
behavior and deception, because the emotional theory makes the most definitive 
predictions about the existence of nonverbal signs of deception.  
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  Inspecting the patterns of strongest cues in Table 1, there are several things to 
note. First, the finding that cues to deception are generally weak supports both the 
self-presentational perspective and double-standard hypothesis. Second, when looking 
at the cues to deception that do appear to be diagnostic, the findings that liars sound 
less immediate and come across as more ambivalent further supports the self-
presentational perspective in that it shows that lies appear less embraced. However, 
these findings can also be considered support for the strategic models, which argue 
that lying involves calculation. It may be that the evasiveness, uncertainty, 
ambivalence and lack of details found in the meta-analytic patterns are not 
unintentional - as the self-presentational perspective might suggest - but may be the 
result of liars being more reluctant to commit to a firm statement because they are 
wary of the possibility of being disproven. Third, there is also support for the 
cognitive load perspective in that, compared to truth tellers, liars appear less 
immediate, more ambivalent, and more uncertain, and their statements are less 
detailed and sound less plausible. However, it should be noted that this is the strength 
of cues that arise without any provocation – recent research has shown that cues to 
cognitive load can become more pronounced through various interventions (Vrij et 
al., 2016; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017).  
  In summary, the empirical evidence provides some support for the self-
presentational perspective and the cognitive load theory, and is also consistent with a 
strategic and morality based view. We believe that the scattered nature of the results 
patterns suggests that researchers might need to rethink the theoretical landscape to 
come to an overarching theory. As a starting point, it may be fruitful to design 
experiments that pit theories against each other in order to get a better understanding 
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of why particular cues arise or do not arise and under which circumstances they may 
or may not arise.  
Reasons why not many diagnostic cues to deceit have been found to date 
  In the previous section we discussed two important reason why not many cues 
to deceit have been found to date: Truth tellers and liars often have similar 
experiences (the self-presentational perspective) and liars often trivialize the 
seriousness of their behavior (the double-standard hypothesis). In this section we 
discuss further reasons. Some reasons make it more likely that more nonverbal cues to 
deception will emerge in future research, but other reasons make it unlikely that many 
more nonverbal cues ever will be found. We start with the optimistic reasons (reasons 
1 to 4). 
1) Some cues are overlooked  
  Perhaps several of the more diagnostic cues to deception have not been 
examined yet to date. We give three examples. Different types of smiles exist but 
most deception researchers do not distinguish between them. Smiling emerges as a 
cue to deceit when subcategories are taken into account. Ekman (1985) has identified 
a number of different smiles, including a distinction between felt and false smiles. 
Felt smiles include smiles in which the person actually experiences a positive 
emotion, whereas false smiles are deliberately contrived to convince another person 
that a positive emotion is felt, when in fact it is not. Felt smiles are accompanied by 
the action of two muscles: the zygomatic major that pulls the lip corners upward 
toward the cheekbone and the orbicularis oculi that raises the cheek and gathers skin 
inward from around the eye socket. The latter change produces bagged skin below the 
eyes and crow’s-feet creases beyond the eye corners. In false smiles, the action of the 
orbicularis oculi muscle causing the effects around the eye is often missing (Frank, 
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Ekman, & Friesen, 1993). Ekman and colleagues found that truth tellers displayed 
more felt smiles than did liars, whereas liars displayed more false smiles than did 
truth tellers. When the distinction between felt and false smiles was not made, truth 
tellers smiled as frequently as liars (Ekman, Friesen, & O’Sullivan, 1988). Other 
differences include that false smiles are more asymmetrical, appear too early or too 
late, and often last longer (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990). 
  Non-verbal communication researchers (Efron, 1941; Ekman & Friesen, 1972; 
McNeill, 1992) have identified many subcategories of hand gestures but deception 
researchers typically ignore these subcategories. Research has shown that cues to 
deceit may arise when subcategories are taken into account. When in an experiment 
hand gestures were taken as a whole no difference emerged between truth tellers and 
liars, but differences were found in subcategories of hand gestures (Caso, 
Maricchiolo, Bonaiuto, Vrij, & Mann, 2006). Truth tellers made significantly more 
deictic gestures (pointing or using the hand to make reference to an object), whereas 
liars made significantly more metaphoric gestures (illustrations of an abstract concept 
such as a closed fist to indicate strength), which are typically made when describing 
abstract ideas (McNeill, 1992). 
  Gaze aversion (looking away from the conversation partner) is the strongest 
stereotypical belief of deception (Global Deception Team, 2006), but is actually not 
associated with deception (DePaulo et al., 2003). This research typically examines 
visual saccadic eye movements, which are eye movements that change the direction 
of people’s visual attention.  However, saccadic eye movements also occur when 
people are not inspecting a visual scene, and often without the person being aware of 
making such movements. These movements occur when people are engaged in tasks 
that require search through long-term memory. Truths, more than lies, are based on 
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extensive and frequent interactions with the real world, and therefore more readily 
accessible from long-term memory (Ganis et al. 2003). It has been found that truth 
tellers displayed fewer non-visual saccades than liars (Vrij, Oliveira, Hammond, & 
Ehrlichman, 2015). 
2) Unprecise measurements 
Another explanation for the lack of diagnostic nonverbal cues to deception is 
that nonverbal behaviors are typically measured too roughly in research (often as 
frequency per minute of videofootage) and/or are not linked with speech (Bull, 2009; 
Ekman, 1981). Although eye contact with a conversation partner does not 
discriminate truth tellers from liars when measured as average per minute of 
interview, it does when examined more subtly. It has been found that liars 
demonstrate slightly prolonged episodes of eye contact that appear somewhat 
unnaturally intense as if they wanted to ‘check out’ their conversation partner, a 
phenomenon labeled deliberate eye contact (Mann et al., 2012a, 2013a, b). There are 
two reasons why liars seek deliberate eye contact. First, they try to convince their 
conversation partner that they are telling the truth, and when people attempt to 
convince others, they tend to looking them in the eyes (Kleinke, 1986). Second, liars 
tend to monitor their conversation partner’s reactions carefully to assess whether they 
appear to be getting away with their lie (Buller & Burgoon, 1996).  
  Others pointed out that nonverbal behavior should be examined in relation to 
speech content (Bull, 2009; Ekman, 2001). It is hereby claimed that in particular 
mismatches between speech and behavior could be indicative of deceit (e.g. a head 
nod while answering “no”). Although such claims are typically illustrated with 
examples, there is no systematic research available supporting this claim. 
3) Idiosyncratic behavior  
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  Perhaps nonverbal cues to deceit occur on an individual level, that is, different 
individuals may give their lies away in different ways (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
Empirical studies present results at a group level rather than at an individual level and 
therefore such studies, as well as meta-analyses based on such studies, cannot capture 
signs of deceit at an individual level, because idiosyncratic cues do not become 
apparent. It is debatable how useful idiosyncratic cues are for practitioners who try to 
detect deceit. Idiosyncratic cues imply that each individual displays an almost unique 
set of cues to deceit, and this probably also varies with the type of lie told and 
situation. An investigator would have no idea which cues to rely on in any individual 
case.  
4) A cluster of cues may be more diagnostic  
  It could be that when researchers examine each nonverbal cue individually, no 
diagnostic cue to deception occurs, but that a diagnostic pattern will arise when a 
combination of cues is taken into account (DePaulo & Morris, 2004). This could perhaps 
explain why concepts such as immediacy, ambivalence, and uncertainty all emerged as 
diagnostic cues to deceit (see Table 1). Making assessments of such states is likely to be 
based on a cluster of behaviors rather than on individual cues.   
5) Situational differences 
  It has been argued that cues to deceit are more likely to occur when the stakes 
are high rather than low (Ekman, 1985; Frank & Svetieva, 2012; O’Sullivan, Frank, 
Hurley, & Tiwana, 2009). In high-stakes situations, when the consequences of being 
judged as deceptive are serious, liars may feel stronger emotions, may experience 
more cognitive demand, and may be more motivated to manage their behavior to 
appear credible. In their meta-analysis, Hartwig and Bond (2014) examined the 
detectability of lies based on nonverbal cues and compared settings which elicit 
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strong emotions with settings of a more trivial nature. No difference was found in the 
detectability of lies between these two settings. The same meta-analysis did not find 
an effect for motivation either. The reason for these null-effects is that emotion and 
motivation will also affect truth tellers. For example, liars may be more likely to 
display nervous behaviors when the stakes are high, but so are truth tellers (Bond & 
Fahey, 1987; Ofshe & Leo, 1997), which means that the difference between them will 
not change.  
  It is more likely that the situation will overshadow differences in behavior 
between truth tellers and liars. For example, being accused of wrongdoing may result 
in different reactions. Some people may panic, whereas other people do not, but 
instead put effort in trying to convince the accuser that they are innocent. Such 
differential reactions are likely to occur in both liars and truth tellers and could 
overshadow the typically subtle nonverbal differences between them. This may 
explain why in one experiment (Vrij, 1995), nonverbal cues to deceit emerged in an 
information-gathering type of interview (in which interviewees were asked to report 
in their own words their activities) but not in an accusatory type of interview (in 
which interviewees were accused of wrongdoing, see also Vrij et al., 2017b).  
6) Contagious behaviors  
  People often automatically and unconsciously mimic the behavior of their 
interaction partners, as seeing someone behave in a particular way activates a 
behavioral representation, causing the perceiver to adopt the exhibited behavior 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). It is difficult to see how behavior can be indicative of 
deception if someone’s behavior is, at least in part, influenced by the behavior of the 
conversation partner. In fact, it easily can go wrong. In one experiment, a (mock) 
police officer was fidgeting with his fingers when interviewing half of the innocent 
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and guilty mock suspects (experimental condition), whereas he kept his fingers still in 
the other half of the interviews (control condition). Both innocent and guilty suspects 
moved their fingers more in the experimental condition. When observers saw the 
videotaped interviews, they perceived the innocent and guilty suspects in the 
experimental condition as more deceptive than those in the control condition 
(Akehurst & Vrij, 1999). In other words, the suspects in the experimental condition 
unconsciously mimicked the fidgety behavior of the officer and their fidgety behavior 
made them appear suspicious.   
  The behavior of one person can also influence the behavior of another person 
in settings other than a mimicry setting. Investigators are sometimes advised to get 
closer physically to suspects during an interrogation (Inbau et al., 2013). Such 
behavior may well elicit gaze aversion in suspects as people typically start to avert 
their gaze when their personal space is invaded (Argyle & Dean, 1965). Since 
investigators typically perceive gaze aversion as a sign of deceit, such a response 
could thus raise suspicion.  
7) Strategies employed by truth tellers and liars 
  Liars employ strategies to appear convincing. They do this more frequently 
than truth tellers, who tend to believe that the truth is transparent (illusion of 
transparency, Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). The nonverbal strategies liars 
and truth tellers employ are likely to be the same: Both will try to suppress behaviors 
they think appear suspicious -mostly signs of nervousness- and will try to replace 
them with behaviors that they think will look honest (Hocking & Leathers, 1980). It is 
a different story for speech content. Truth tellers’ strategy is to ‘tell it all’ and to give 
as much detail as they can remember. In contrast, liars do not wish to give too much 
detail out of fear that investigators can check such details and will discover that they 
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are lying (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012). In 
summary, to appear convincing truth tellers and liar employ similar nonverbal 
strategies but different verbal strategies (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 
2010; Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Granhag, 2010). This may explain why speech content is 
more revealing about deception than nonverbal behavior. 
Accuracy in lie detection through observing nonverbal cues 
  Bond and DePaulo (2006) published the most comprehensive meta-analysis 
about people’s ability to detect deceit to date. They analyzed the results from 206 
documents including almost 25,000 observers. These observers made veracity 
judgements based on watching videotapes, listening to audiotapes or reading 
transcripts from truth tellers and liars. On average, 54% of their judgments were 
correct, a performance just better than chance (50%). It made a difference to which 
medium observers were exposed. When they could only see the target person, they 
performed worse (52% accuracy) than when they could only hear the target person 
(63%), with an accuracy rate in between those two scores (56%) when they could 
both see and hear the target person. This suggests that access to verbal content 
facilitates discrimination between truths and lies. A meta-analysis about the effect of 
lie detection training supported this conclusion: Training focusing on vocal and visual 
cues to deceit only resulted in small improvements, whereas training related to speech 
content resulted in medium sized improvements (Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & 
Meissner, 2016). Of course, observers may make veracity judgements not to their full 
potential when observing behavior, and may fail to spot some diagnostic cues. 
Hartwig & Bond (2014) addressed this issue by examining accuracy rates based on 
multiple nonverbal cues that were coded objectively. Although this is the ‘ideal’ 
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situation for nonverbal lie detection, and includes complex decision making models 
that only computers can make, the accuracy rate was still rather low, 67.68%. 
  Apart from lower accuracy, Bond and DePaulo’s (2006) meta-analysis 
revealed a second negative consequence of paying attention to visual cues only: 
Messages judged from visual cues result in a lie bias - the tendency to judge someone 
as a liar. Access to visual information only should encourage the use of nonverbal 
stereotypes because, when speech content is unavailable, observers have little other 
than their stereotypical beliefs to rely on (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Since nonverbal 
stereotypes relate to the behavior of liars rather than truth tellers (e.g., liars lack eye 
contact and fidget), a lie bias is the result. This could perhaps explain why American 
police investigators typically show a lie bias (Kassin, Meissner, & Norwick, 2005; 
Meissner & Kassin, 2002), whereas their British counterparts do not (Mann, Vrij, & 
Bull, 2004; Mann, Vrij, Fisher, & Robinson, 2008). American officers are trained to 
pay attention to nonverbal behavior when attempting to detect deceit, whereas British 
investigators are instructed to ignore nonverbal behavior (e.g. Vrij et al., 2017b).  
  Following the same reasoning, using nonverbal lie detection tools could result 
in a lie bias. People find it difficult to pay attention to speech and behavior 
simultaneously (Patterson, 1995). Therefore, when investigators are taught to pay 
attention to behavior, they will be inclined to solely focus on behavior and to ignore 
speech content.  
  Bond and DePaulo (2006) also compared the performance of presumed 
deception experts (e.g. law enforcement personnel, psychiatrists, job interviewers) 
with laypersons (typically college students), but found no difference in accuracy 
between the two groups. A difference emerged between them in terms of confidence, 
with deception experts being more confident than laypersons (Kassin, Meissner, & 
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Norwick, 2005). The tendency to be confident is not unique to police officers or lie 
detection, but common amongst many groups of professionals in carrying out various 
tasks (Allwood & Granhag, 1999). 
Although the Bond and DePaulo (2006) article is more than ten years old, it is 
still the most comprehensive text about observers’ ability to detect lies. Since then 
research has shown that under some circumstances people’s ability to detect lies 
becomes substantially better, but no line of research has shown that such an improved 
accuracy rate can be obtained through observing behaviors. Instead, using specific 
interview protocols and analyse speech content offers improvements (Hartwig, 
Granhag, & Luke, 2014; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017), so does taking into account 
contextual factors, including familiarity with the topic and context of the conversation 
(Levine, 2015). 
People’s views on the relationship between nonverbal behavior and deception 
  Table 2 presents an overview of a selection of nonverbal cues to deceit, which 
are often claimed to be diagnostic cues to deceit on the internet, in popular magazines, 
non-scientific books or American police manuals (Vrij, 2008). For each cue Table 2 
presents (1) its actual relationship with deception according to DePaulo et al.’s (2003) 
meta-analysis and (2) how people believe it is related to deception, based on 
numerous surveys in the area (Vrij, 2008).  
  Table 2 shows first that 13 of the 16 cues are not related to deception, and the 
three that are diagnostic show only small effect sizes. In contrast, people typically 
believe that most of these 16 cues are related to deception and the direction of these 
relationships (e.g., liars display gaze aversion and make many movements) is in 
accordance with what can be read on the internet, or in popular magazines, non-
scientific books and police manuals about the topic. Deception experts and laypersons 
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share the same stereotypical views about nonverbal cues to deceit (Vrij, Akehurst, & 
Knight, 2006). 
Why people continue to make nonverbally based veracity assessments 
  There are numerous reasons as to why people continue to make nonverbally 
based veracity assessments despite the lack of evidence that they actually work. In 
this section we present what we believe are the main reasons.  
Little choice other than to observe behaviors   
  There are situations in which investigators have little choice other than to 
observe behaviors, for example, when attempting to spot wrongdoers in public spaces 
such as airports, public transport, and sporting events. Intriguingly, we are not aware 
of any published peer-reviewed research about what officers are supposed to look for 
in such situations. In general, we believe that the nonverbal deception research carried 
out to date does not fit well with situations in which such assessments are important, 
see Box 1. The (U.S.) Government Accountability Office (2017) reviewed the 
evidence behind the (U.S.) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) program of 
spotting possible wrongdoers at American airports. It concluded that the TSA has no 
evidence that most indicators it uses to identify wrongdoers at airports are actually 
suitable for that purpose.  
  Police interview styles differ between the U.S and Western European 
countries. In the U.S. accusatory interview techniques are typically employed, 
whereas in Western Europe information-gathering techniques are used (Meissner et 
al., 2014). Officers who use accusatory interview styles of interviewing are 
encouraged to pay attention to nonverbal behavior, whereas those who use 
information-gathering interviews are encouraged to solely concentrate on the speech 
content (Vrij et al., 2017b). This difference could be the result of how much a suspect 
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speaks. Suspects are encouraged to speak more in information-gathering interviews -
and actually say more in such interviews- than in accusatory interviews (Meissner et 
al., 2014). The less suspects say (accusatory interviews), the more inclined 
investigators will be to pay attention to nonverbal behaviors (Vrij et al., 2017b). 
Lack of self-insight 
  People do not have proper insight into their own behavior when they lie. In an 
experiment participants both told the truth and lied and were subsequently asked how 
they thought they behaved in both interviews (Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001). They 
mistakenly believed that they showed stereotypical behaviors such as gaze aversion 
and excessive movements when they lied. When people lie they are more aware of 
their behavior than when they tell the truth, and are particularly aware of exhibiting 
any behaviors that they think look suspicious. Liars think that displaying gaze 
aversion and making movements looks suspicious, so they are aware of these 
behaviors each time they display them. What they do not realize is that they also 
display such behaviors when telling the truth.  
The power of stereotypes  
  Social psychology research has shown that once stereotypical views have been 
formed (e.g., the notion that liars display gaze aversion and excessive movements), 
various cognitive processes are activated with the result that these stereotypical views 
are most likely to endure. For example, once incorrect views have been formed, people 
will perceive supporting evidence that in fact does not exist, so-called illusory 
correlations (Stroessner & Plaks, 2001). To illustrate, when observers were informed 
that someone was lying, they overestimated the amount of gaze aversion the alleged liar 
actually displayed (Levine, Asada, & Park, 2006).  
  Also, people tend to seek information that confirms rather than disconfirms their 
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beliefs (so-called confirmation bias, Darley & Gross, 1983). Any support they find for 
their beliefs will boost their confidence that their views are correct, making it less likely 
that they will alter them. Of course, people will always find supporting evidence, for 
example, sometimes liars will look away or will make excessive movements.  
Moreover, when people come across an example that disconfirms their beliefs, 
they are more likely to disregard it than interpret this new evidence as a sign that their 
initial belief is incorrect, a phenomenon called belief perseverance (Anderson, Lepper, 
& Ross, 1980).  
Also, once people have formed an opinion that makes sense to them, they will 
come up with further reasons to support their view (the power of thinking, Tesser, 1978). 
If people are asked why they think liars look away, they may think of reasons to 
corroborate this view and search their memory for examples where they encountered 
liars who averted their gaze (Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004). Thinking about 
examples that support their beliefs will strengthen their opinion.  
  Finally, people often do not receive adequate feedback that is required to learn 
from their own experience and to discover that their views are inaccurate. For feedback 
to be effective, it needs to be given frequently, reliably and immediately. In terms of 
feedback about nonverbal cues to deception, observers should be informed immediately 
after every interaction with another person whether that person was lying or not. Of 
course, this is not a realistic scenario. If people discover that they have been lied to, it is 
often a long time after the interaction took place (Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison, 
& Ferrara, 2002), by which time they have probably forgotten how the person behaved. 
Insert Box 1 about here 
Culturally transmitted misbeliefs   
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It is likely that most misbeliefs about nonverbal behaviour and deception are 
culturally transmitted (Sperber, 2009).  For example, there are numerous popular 
writings about the relationship between nonverbal behavior and deception. Most of 
them reiterate common stereotypes and boldly state nonverbal lie detection works. 
Therefore, most people will have been exposed to incorrect information about the 
topic (Hurley, Griffin, & Stefanone, 2014), believing it to be true.  
Future directions in nonverbal deception research 
  One aim of this review was to reveal gaps in nonverbal deception research, of 
which we have identified three. First, more work is needed on the theoretical side, 
including carrying out experiments that pit existing theories against each other, so that 
their strengths and weaknesses can be revealed. Such experiments should also aim to 
search for an overarching theory that explains the complicated findings in this domain 
better than the existing theories. Second, we presented several reasons as to why not 
many diagnostic cues to deceit have been found to date. Several of them presented an 
optimistic view that more diagnostic cues could be found and these positive reasons 
are worth to explore further. Third, researchers should focus on examining nonverbal 
behaviors in settings where there is no alternative to making nonverbal veracity 
assessments. Although this advice sounds obvious, it has not been followed to date.  
Concluding remarks 
  If we take a bird’s-eye view of the nonverbal communication and lie detection 
world we see, first of all, a broken theoretical landscape. Many theories do exist, but 
none of them appears to fully capture the relationship between nonverbal behavior 
and deception. Amongst the inhabitants in this landscape, we find liars who tell their 
stories in various settings, including in settings where nonverbal communication is 
crucial. Those liars are (surprisingly) ignored, and the research focus is on liars who 
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act in settings where nonverbal communication is less important. We also find lie-
catchers who are not as good at reading other people as they may think. In fact, their 
skills are mediocre and they hold robust misbeliefs about nonverbal cues to deceit. 
They also appear active in telling each other that their method of lie detection works 
without providing the crucial evidence to support these claims.  
Summary points 
1) Various theories about nonverbal communication and deception exists but they do 
not fully explain why liars behave the way they behave. 
2) Nonverbal cues to deception are faint and unreliable, but verbal cues to deceit are 
more diagnostic 
3) A more optimistic picture about nonverbal cues to deception may emerge if 
researchers examine the cues differently and do so in more relevant settings 
4) People’s ability to detect lies is mediocre, particularly if they only have access to 
visual cues 
5) People overestimate the relationship between nonverbal behavior and deception 
and assume many relationships that are actually untrue (stereotypes).  
6) These stereotypical views are hard to debunk 
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Table 1. Diagnostic (non)verbal cues to deceit based on at least six measurements  
 
Cue d-score Type of cue 
Verbal and vocal immediacy (impressions) (Responses that sound 
direct, relevant, clear and personal) 
-0.55 Verbal and vocal 
Discrepant, ambivalent (Communication seems internally inconsistent 
or information from different sources (e.g. face vs voice) seems 
contradictory; speaker seems to be ambivalent) 
0.34 Mixture of 
verbal, vocal and 
visual 
Details (units of information) -0.30 Verbal 
Verbal and vocal uncertainty (impressions) (Speaker seems 
uncertain, insecure or not very dominant, assertive or empathic; speaker 
seems to have difficulty in answering the question) 
0.30 Verbal 
Nervous, tense (overall) (Speaker seems nervous or makes body 
movements that seem nervous) 
0.27 Visual 
Vocal tension (Voice sounds tense, not relaxed) 0.26 Vocal 
Logical structure (Consistency and coherence of statements) -0.25 Verbal 
Plausibility (Degree to which the message seems likely or believable) -0.23 Verbal 
Frequency, pitch (Voice pitch sounds high or fundamental frequency of 
the voice) 
0.21 Vocal 
Negative statements and complaints (Degree to which the message 
sounds negative or includes complaints) 
0.21 Verbal 
Verbal and vocal involvement (Speaker describes personal 
experiences or describe events in a personal and revealing way; speakers 
seems vocally expressive) 
-0.21 Verbal and vocal 
Fidgeting (Object or self-fidgeting (undifferentiated)) 0.16 Visual 
Illustrators (Gestures that accompany speech) -0.14 Visual 
Facial pleasantness -0.12 Visual 
Note: Taken from DePaulo et al. (2003) 
Note: Negative d-scores indicate truth telling and positive d-scores indicate lying.  
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Table 2. An overview of frequently mentioned nonverbal cues to deceit and their 
actual relationship with deception according to DePaulo et al. (2003) and believed 
relationships with deception according to Vrij (2008) 
Vocal cues Actual relationship Believed relationship 
Hesitations (Use of speech fillers 
e.g.,"ah", "um", "er", “uh” and 
“hmmm”) 
.04 L 
Speech errors (Grammatical 
errors, word and/or sentence 
repetition, false starts, sentence 
change, sentence incompletions, 
slips of the tongue, etc.) 
.00 L 
High-pitch voice .21 L 
Speech rate (Number of spoken 
words in a certain period of time) 
.07 - 
Latency period (Period of silence 
between question and answer) 
.02 - 
Pause (Silent, filled or mixed 
pauses) 
.02 L 
Visual cues   
Gaze aversion (Looking away 
from the conversation partner) 
.03 L 
Smiles (Smiling and laughing) .00 - 
Facial-fidgeting (Face touching 
or rubbing hair) 
.08 L 
Self-fidgeting (Touching, 
rubbing or scratching body or face) 
-.01 L 
Fidgeting (Undifferentiated) .16 L 
Illustrators (Hand and arm 
movements designed to modify 




(Movements of legs and feet) 
-.09 L 
Posture shifts (Movements made 
to change seating position) 
.05 L 
Head movements (Head nods 
and head shakes) 
-.02 L 
Eye blinks (Blinking of the eyes) .07 L 
Note: Positive d-scores indicate increase in liars and negative d-scores indicate 
decrease in liars, significant relationships are indicated in bold. 
Note: ‘L’ means that people associate the cue with lying; ‘-‘ means that people do not 
think there is a relationship between the cue and deception 
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Figure 1: Theories on nonverbal behavior and deception     
  
Self-presentational theory  
Social psychological theories 
Moral psychology theory Interpersonal deception 
Strategic models Cognitive load 
Cognition Emotion 
Mental processes 
Theories on nonverbal behavior and deception 
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Box 1: Possible settings in which an analysis of nonverbal behavior could take place  
Type of setting Realistic 
setting? 





No interview and target does not speak  Yes Target observed 
at an airport 
Definitely No 
An interview setting, but target does not speak  Yes Custodial 
interview, 
suspect is silent 
Definitely No 
Target is interviewed outside the interview 
room 
Yes Target 





An interview setting, the target speaks, but no 
interaction between interviewer/ target 




An interview setting, the target speaks, 









An interview setting, the target speaks, 
interaction between the interviewer/ target and 
background evidence exists 





  In Box 1 we list possible settings in which an analysis of nonverbal behavior 
could take place. We do not provide a complete list of all possible settings, but a list 
of settings that are relevant for the current overview. Each setting is assessed in terms 
of whether it is realistic (its operational relevance), whether it requires an analysis of 
nonverbal behavior, and the extent to which the setting has been addressed in 
nonverbal communication and deception research.  
  Box 1 allows us to draw several conclusions. First, an analysis of nonverbal 
behavior could, at least theoretically, take place in many different settings. However, 
second, it also shows that there are only a few settings for which an analysis of 
nonverbal behavior is absolutely essential. Basically, a nonverbal analysis is required 
only when the target does not speak. Third, the few settings in which an analysis of 
nonverbal behavior is required have not been addressed in research. Fourth, the vast 
majority of deception research has addressed a setting in which the target speaks (for 
a brief period), but where there is no real interaction between the target and the 
interviewer. This is not a realistic setting. In fact, we could not produce one single 
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example that illustrates this setting. The overall conclusion is clear: Researchers 
should refocus and should examine nonverbal communication in settings where a 
nonverbal analysis is required.  
 
 
 
 
